Validation

What is it? And how to participate

The BRRR protocol adopts a decentralized validator model, wherein any holder of the native BRRR token may elect to participate in system operations as a Validator. This validator eligibility is inherently permissionless, facilitating an open ecosystem that incentivizes participation through reward driven mechanisms and enforces reliability through cryptoeconomic penalties.

To assume the role of a validator, a BRRR token holder must engage in staking, which entails the locking of a predetermined quantity of BRRR tokens into a designated Security Deposit (SD) smart contract. This process binds the validator’s operational commitments to a tangible economic stake, aligning incentives with the integrity of the protocol.

Omnibus Staking Availability

Staking is supported across all BRRR-enabled networks, allowing validators to commit collateral on the network most aligned with their infrastructure.

This is achieved via the protocol’s chain-agnostic architecture and reconciled on the Accounting Chain, maintaining a unified ledger state for validator eligibility.

Unstaking and Withdrawal Delay

To mitigate the risk of malicious behavior and support protocol-level finality guarantees, the protocol enforces a 7-day unbonding period following any unstaking request. This slashing window allows pending obligations to be verified before funds are released.

  • BRRR unstaking parameters

    • Unstaking time for validator, iiUiU_i
    • Withdrawal delay in daysτs=7\tau_s = 7

Then a temporal security measure or a withdrawal becomes available at:

Wi=Ui+τsW_i = U_i + \tau_s

Emission Rewards for Validators

Validators are incentivized through a dynamic emission schedule. Each processed transaction earns rewards according to system activity and individual contribution.

  • BRRR validator rewards

    • Cumulative transactions by month, ttT(t)T(t)
    • Target transactionsTtrT_{tr}
    • Emission lifespanLL
    • Maximum BRRR token supplySmaxS_{max}
    • Allocated portion of SmaxS_{max}PsP_s
    • Monthly decay rateDD
    • BRRR balance held by a validatorBiB_i
    • Monthly Rewards to participant, iiRi(t)R_i(t)
    • Total monthly emission rewardsRtotal(t)R_{total}(t)

To estimate monthly emission target:

Rtotal(t)=Smax⋅Ps⋅(0.944)t−1R_{\text{total}}(t) = S_{\text{max}} \cdot P_s \cdot (0.944)^{t-1}

Adjusting for actual transaction activity:

f(t)=T(t)Ttr⋅tLf(t) = \frac{T(t)}{T_{tr} \cdot \frac{t}{L}}
Ractual(t)=Rtotal(t)⋅min⁡(1,f(t))R_{\text{actual}}(t) = R_{\text{total}}(t) \cdot \min(1, f(t))

Estimating share of the emission reward per validator:

si(t)=BiBtotal(t)s_i(t) = \frac{B_i}{B_{\text{total}}(t)}
Ri(t)=si(t)⋅Ractual(t)R_i(t) = s_i(t) \cdot R_{\text{actual}}(t)

APR calculations:

APRi(t)=12⋅Ri(t)Bi⋅100%\text{APR}_i(t) = 12 \cdot \frac{R_i(t)}{B_i} \cdot 100\%

With monthly compounding:

APRi(t)=((1+Ri(t)Bi)12−1)⋅100%\text{APR}_i(t) = \left( \left(1 + \frac{R_i(t)}{B_i} \right)^{12} - 1 \right) \cdot 100\%

Estimation of the emissions rewards for the validators:

APRi(t)=((1+si(t)⋅Rtotal(t)⋅min⁡(1,f(t))Bi)12−1)⋅100%\text{APR}_i(t) = \left( \left(1 + \frac{s_i(t) \cdot R_{\text{total}}(t) \cdot \min(1, f(t))}{B_i} \right)^{12} - 1 \right) \cdot 100\%

Slashing and Penalty Enforcement

Validators may be penalized via slashing for unfulfilled obligations, such as delayed reconciliation or failed guarantees.

  • BRRR slashing parameters

    • Staked depositSDiSD_i
    • Slashing severity coefficientσ∈[0,1]\sigma \in [0, 1]

These penalties are enforced through automated or dispute-driven mechanisms as outlined in the protocol documentation.

Si=σ⋅SDiS_i = \sigma \cdot SD_i